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質問 # 21
Which of the following represents a valid Windows Registry key?
正解:A
解説:
The Windows Registry is a hierarchical database storing system and application settings, organized into predefined root keys (hives). Only specific names are valid as top-level keys.
Why A is correct: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM) is a standard root key containing hardware and system-wide configuration data. CNSP references it for security settings analysis (e.g., auditing policies).
Why other options are incorrect:
B: HKEY_INTERNAL_CONFIG is not a valid key; no such hive exists.
C: HKEY_ROOT_CLASSES is a misspelling; the correct key is HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR).
D: HKEY_LOCAL_USER is incorrect; the valid key is HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU).
質問 # 22
Which Kerberos ticket is required to generate a Silver Ticket?
正解:A
解説:
A Silver Ticket is a forged Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS - Ticket Granting Service) in Active Directory, granting access to a specific service (e.g., MSSQL, CIFS) without KDC interaction. Unlike a Golden Ticket (TGT forgery), it requires:
Service Account's NTLM Hash: The target service's account (e.g., MSSQLSvc) hash, not a ticket.
Forgery: Tools like Mimikatz craft the TGS (e.g., kerberos::golden /service:<spn> /user:<user> /ntlm:<hash>).
Kerberos Flow (RFC 4120):
TGT (Ticket-Granting Ticket): Obtained via AS (Authentication Service) with user creds.
TGS: Requested from TGS (Ticket Granting Service) using TGT for service access.
Silver Ticket Process:
No TGT needed; the attacker mimics the TGS step using the service account's stolen hash (e.g., from a compromised host).
C . Service Account Ticket: Misnomer-it's the hash of the service account (e.g., MSSQLSvc) that enables forgery, not a pre-existing ticket. CNSP's phrasing likely tests this nuance.
Security Implications: Silver Tickets are stealthier than Golden Tickets (service-specific, shorter-lived). CNSP likely stresses hash protection (e.g., LAPS) and Kerberos monitoring.
Why other options are incorrect:
A . Session Ticket: Not a Kerberos term; confuses session keys.
B . TGT: Used for Golden Tickets, not Silver.
D: Incorrect; the service account's hash (implied by "ticket") is essential.
Real-World Context: Silver Tickets exploited in APT29 attacks (2020 SolarWinds) for lateral movement.
質問 # 23
What user account is required to create a Golden Ticket in Active Directory?
正解:C
解説:
A Golden Ticket is a forged Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) in Active Directory (AD), granting an attacker unrestricted access to domain resources by impersonating any user (e.g., with Domain Admin privileges). Kerberos, per RFC 4120, relies on the KRBTGT account-a built-in service account on every domain controller-to encrypt and sign TGTs. To forge a Golden Ticket, an attacker needs:
The KRBTGT password hash (NTLM or Kerberos key), typically extracted from a domain controller's memory using tools like Mimikatz.
Additional domain details (e.g., SID, domain name).
Process:
Compromise a domain controller (e.g., via privilege escalation).
Extract the KRBTGT hash (e.g., lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt).
Forge a TGT with arbitrary privileges using the hash (e.g., Mimikatz's kerberos::golden command).
The KRBTGT account itself isn't "used" to create the ticket; its hash is the key ingredient. Unlike legitimate TGTs issued by the KDC, a Golden Ticket bypasses authentication checks, persisting until the KRBTGT password is reset (a rare event in most environments). CNSP likely highlights this as a high-severity AD attack vector.
Why other options are incorrect:
A . Local User account: Local accounts are machine-specific, lack domain privileges, and can't access the KRBTGT hash stored on domain controllers.
B . Domain User account: A standard user has no inherent access to domain controller credentials or the KRBTGT hash without escalation.
C . Service account: While service accounts may have elevated privileges, they don't automatically provide the KRBTGT hash unless compromised to domain admin level-still insufficient without targeting KRBTGT specifically.
Real-World Context: The 2014 Sony Pictures hack leveraged Golden Tickets, emphasizing the need for KRBTGT hash rotation post-breach (a complex remediation step).
質問 # 24
Which SMB (Server Message Block) network protocol versions are vulnerable to the EternalBlue (MS17-010) Windows exploit?
正解:D
解説:
EternalBlue (MS17-010) is an exploit targeting a buffer overflow in Microsoft's SMB (Server Message Block) implementation, leaked by the Shadow Brokers in 2017. SMB enables file/printer sharing:
SMBv1 (1980s): Legacy, used in Windows NT/XP.
SMBv2 (2006, Vista): Enhanced performance/security.
SMBv3 (2012, Windows 8): Adds encryption, multichannel.
Vulnerability:
EternalBlue exploits a flaw in SMBv1's SRVNET driver (srv.sys), allowing remote code execution via crafted packets. Microsoft patched it in March 2017 (MS17-010).
Affected OS: Windows XP to Server 2016 (pre-patch), if SMBv1 enabled.
Proof: WannaCry/NotPetya used it, targeting port 445/TCP.
SMBv1 Only: The bug resides in SMBv1's packet handling (e.g., TRANS2 requests). SMBv2/v3 rewrote this code, immune to the specific overflow.
Microsoft: Post-patch, SMBv1 is disabled by default (Windows 10 1709+).
Security Implications: CNSP likely stresses disabling SMBv1 (e.g., via Group Policy) and patching, as EternalBlue remains a threat in legacy environments.
Why other options are incorrect:
B, C: SMBv2/v3 aren't vulnerable; the flaw is SMBv1-specific.
D: SMBv2 isn't affected, only SMBv1.
Real-World Context: WannaCry's 2017 rampage hit unpatched SMBv1 systems (e.g., NHS), costing billions.
質問 # 25
Where are the password hashes stored in the Linux file system?
正解:A
解説:
In Linux, password hashes are stored in a secure file to protect user authentication data. The evolution of Linux security practices moved password storage from plaintext or weakly protected files to a more secure location.
Why C is correct: The /etc/shadow file is the standard location for storing password hashes in modern Linux systems. This file is readable only by the root user, enhancing security by restricting access. It contains encrypted password hashes (typically using algorithms like SHA-512), along with user details such as password expiration policies. CNSP documentation on Linux security emphasizes /etc/shadow as the authoritative source for password hashes, replacing older methods.
Why other options are incorrect:
A . /etc/passwd: Historically, /etc/passwd stored passwords in plaintext or weakly hashed forms (e.g., using DES), but modern systems use it only for user account information (e.g., UID, GID, home directory) and reference /etc/shadow for hashes.
B . /etc/password: This is not a valid file in the Linux file system; it appears to be a typographical error or misunderstanding, with no recognized role in password storage.
D . /usr/bin/shadow: /usr/bin contains executable binaries, not configuration or data files like password hashes. /etc/shadow is the correct path.
質問 # 26
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CNSP試験参考書の品質を確保するために、弊社の専門家はずっと問題集の研究に取り組んでいます。また、弊社は多くのお金と時間をかけてCNSP試験参考書を作りました。専門家はいろいろな知識と経験があるので、この点で、心配する必要がないです。なんといっても、CNSP試験参考書は素晴らしい資料です。
CNSP日本語版復習資料: https://www.certjuken.com/CNSP-exam.html